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Do Unemployed Workers Benefit from Enterprise Zones? 
The French Experience 
 
This paper presents an impact evaluation of the French enterprise zone program which was 
initiated in 1997 to help unemployed workers find employment by granting a significant wage-
tax exemption (about one third of total labor costs) to firms hiring at least 20% of their labor 
force locally. Drawing from a unique geo-referenced dataset of unemployment spells in the 
Paris region over an extensive period of time (1993-2003), we are able to measure the direct 
effect of the program on unemployment duration, distinguishing between short- and medium-
term effects. This is done by implementing an original two-stage empirical strategy using 
individual data in the first stage and aggregate data and conditional linear matching 
techniques in the second stage. We show that although the enterprise zones program tended 
to “pick winners”, it is likely to be cost-ineffective. It had a small but significant effect on the 
rate at which unemployed workers find a job (which is increased by a modest 3 percent). This 
effect is localized and significant only in the short run (i.e. at best during the 3 years that 
follow the start of the policy). 
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 1 Introduction1
Most cities have distressed neighborhoods where jobs are few and unemployment is rampant. Con-
sidering that the lack of labor demand in poor areas is a key contributor to local unemployment,
a number of countries, including the US, the UK and France have responded by implementing
spatially targeted policies to encourage job creation or ￿rm relocation to these areas. These
policies￿ often designated as enterprise zone (EZ) programs￿ revolve around the simple idea that
granting ￿scal incentives to ￿rms in distressed neighborhoods can boost local hires. Although
intuitively appealing, enterprise zones are in fact rather controversial as many observers have
questioned their ability to reach their objectives and whether achieved bene￿ts are su¢ cient to
balance costs (Peters and Fishers, 2004).
In this paper, we provide an impact evaluation of the French enterprise zones experience,
focusing on the Paris region for which there exists an exhaustive and georeferenced dataset of
unemployment spells that allows for an adequate evaluation of the policy at the local level. The
key measure in the French program is that, in order to be exempted from the wage tax, ￿rms
need to hire at least 20% of their labor force locally. In the French context, this is a signi￿cant
incentive given that the wage tax￿ which depends on the wage level, the type of work and the
work contract￿ represents more that one third of all labor costs borne by employers. The policy
was thus expected to improve local employment through hires made by existing, relocating, or
newly-created ￿rms drawing from the local pool of unemployed workers.
Our empirical strategy for the impact evaluation of the program is original in various ways:
1The authors are grateful to a coeditor and a referee for their insighful comments and to participants at the
following conferences and seminars: NARSC ￿ 08, EALE ￿ 09, ESEM ￿ 09, London School of Economics and the 2nd
French Econometrics Conference, for their helpful comments, and particularly to Roland Rathelot, Shawn Rohlin
and Je⁄rey Zax. We would also like to thank the French Ministry of Health (MiRe-DREES) and the French
Ministry of Labor (DARES) for ￿nancial support. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors
and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of those institutions or of our employers, including the World Bank, its
Executive Board, or the countries they represent. All remaining errors are ours.
2We depart from the approach used in previous papers in the literature as we investigate the
propensity of local unemployed workers to ￿nd a job. This is an appropriate, precise, and well-
targeted indicator of policy success given the explicit policy goal of helping residents in distressed
areas ￿nd jobs and given the existence of a unique dataset on unemployment durations and exits
with observations at high frequency. Using continuous-time unemployment duration data allows
us to focus on the semesters around the implementation of the program and distinguish short
run from medium run e⁄ects of the policy. This approach contrasts with other evaluations of
enterprise zones which have usually focused on the growth in the local number of establishments
or on the number of local jobs that were created as a result of the policy. But since job and
establishment creations may also bene￿t residents from non-targeted areas, such indicators can
only be suggestive of the true e⁄ect on unemployment in targeted areas.
Our methodology allows us to estimate the unemployment duration for each of the 1,300
municipalities in the Paris region, the municipality being the ￿nest spatial unit of analysis that
is available in the data. Since municipalities have a population size which is broadly twice that
of the enterprise zone they contain, this means that we capture the overall e⁄ect in the EZ and
non-EZ parts of a same municipality. Since municipalities are relatively small, however, we are
able to investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities.
Even though we do not have a controlled experiment, we argue that because policy makers
selected treated municipalities on observables, matching techniques can be used for the impact
evaluation. Moreover, while designation was indeed based on a criterion that included measures
of population and labor force composition, political tampering implied imperfect targeting of mu-
nicipalities so that some municipalities that were not targeted by the program have characteristics
similar to those of treated municipalities and can be used as a control group.
As the existence of political tampering does not exclude other sources of selection on unob-
servables that would bias the results of matching techniques, we address selection issues in our
3two-stage methodology. In the ￿rst stage, we propose a new econometric approach to estimate
local e⁄ects while controlling for individual variables to avoid composition biases. To do that,
we use a proportional hazard model of individual unemployment durations which is strati￿ed by
municipality as was originally proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) and extended by Gobillon,
Magnac and Selod (2011). This Strati￿ed Partial Likelihood Estimator (SPLE) estimates the spa-
tial e⁄ects measuring the easiness with which residents exit unemployment for each municipality
in the Paris region for each semester between 1993 and 2003. This procedure e⁄ectively addresses
two issues. Firstly, municipality e⁄ects are purged of the composition e⁄ects of the residents.
Secondly, right censoring that a⁄ects unemployment durations is accounted for in the estimation.
In the second stage, in order to assess the e⁄ect of the policy, we measure how these munic-
ipality e⁄ects changed over time (before and after the creation of enterprise zones) comparing
municipalities that host an enterprise zone (the "treated" municipalities) and other municipalities
of comparable characteristics (the control group). This second stage uses conditional matching
techniques to address possible issues of treatment selectivity (see Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009,
for a recent survey). Given our ￿ne control of composition and right censoring biases in the ￿rst
stage, and given the way selection into treatment was implemented, we argue that, conditional on
the variables that a⁄ect treatment probability, trends in unemployment durations in treated and
control municipalities would have been on average similar in the absence of treatment. The results
of our empirical strategy prove to be robust to a variety of appropriate robustness checks including
rede￿nition of control groups (Smith and Todd, 2005), rede￿nition of the treatment status so as
to capture spatial spillover e⁄ects, as well as various weighting schemes and the introduction of
other controlling factors.
Our results point to three main conclusions. First, we ￿nd evidence that the policy tended to
￿pick winners￿ , that is to select municipalities in which unemployed workers face better prospects,
a common feature in many EZ programs. Second, and more importantly, we ￿nd that enterprise
4zones have a temporary and moderate but signi￿cant impact on exit rates from unemployment
to employment. At the time the policy was initiated, the average number of unemployed workers
residing in municipalities that bene￿ted from the enterprise zone program and who could ￿nd a
job increased by a modest 3%. Since, on average, about 300 unemployed workers found a job every
semester in each municipality in our sample, this means that, over a six month period, the policy
only helped an additional 10 workers ￿nd a job. This is very modest in view of the cost of the
policy. Furthermore, our results suggest that this positive e⁄ect only occurred in the short run (at
most 3 years) as we do not ￿nd evidence of medium run e⁄ects between 3 and 6 years. Finally,
the e⁄ect on unemployment exits remains localized and no spillover e⁄ects are signi￿cant.
Our work complements an econometric study of the impact of the French enterprise zone pro-
gram on the growth in the number of establishments which found that the policy had a signi￿cant
positive impact. This impact remains limited however when considering the large cost of the policy
(see Rathelot and Sillard, 2009). More generally, the limited impact of tax exemption policies is
also con￿rmed by a general equilibrium analysis based on the calibration of matching models of
worker and ￿rm mobility (SidibØ, 2011).
The structure of the paper is as follows. The section following this introduction provides a
survey of the literature on enterprise zones and presents the enterprise zone program in France.
We describe our data in a third section, and in a fourth section we explain our identi￿cation
strategy. In the ￿fth section, we present the results of the policy evaluation. A sixth section
concludes and discusses policy lessons.
2 Enterprise zones: lessons from other impact evaluations
Enterprise zones (EZ) programs are territorial discrimination policies that consist in providing tax
incentives and exemptions from regulations to speci￿c blighted areas. The objective is to promote
local economic development and, in particular, to improve the level of local employment through
5incentives for ￿rms to invest, hire, locate or relocate to the targeted areas. Following the UK and
US experiences, France voted its ￿rst EZ program in 1996, and implemented it the following year.
A comparison of existing EZ programs shows that the speci￿c ￿scal tools that are used vary
widely from di⁄erent forms of relief on capital taxation to employment and hiring tax credits, or
a combination of both. In what follows, we will focus on whether they can succeed in promoting
employment by subsidizing labor (e.g. relief on wage taxes) which should have an unambiguous
e⁄ect on employment by strengthening the incentives to hire workers.
Nonetheless, several criticisms grounded in economic theory have been formulated. A ￿rst issue
is that ￿scal incentives may turn out to provide windfall e⁄ects to ￿rms who would have hired
workers in any case, with little impact on the local level of employment. The e⁄ects of enterprise
zones could also be transitory only due to the exhaustion of opportunities for local job creation
or because of the phasing out of subsidies. They could cause geographical shifts in jobs from non-
EZ to EZ areas only although this need not be considered a failure of the policy if it is socially
desirable to spatially redistribute jobs to places of low employment. Furthermore, in the absence of
tax revenue compensation, enterprise zone programs may lead to a decrease in the local provision
of public services, which in turn may render targeted localities less attractive for ￿rm and harm
local residents. Lastly, it can be argued that providing only ￿scal incentives could be insu¢ cient to
improve local employment when there is above all a mismatch between unemployed workers￿skills
and job requirements. Area designation could even result in the stigmatisation of the targeted
neighborhood, further exacerbating the redlining behavior of employers.
2.1 A brief survey of recent evaluations
In view of the above arguments, whether enterprise zones successfully manage to improve employ-
ment may thus strongly depend on the speci￿city of each program. Some implementation options
may indeed be more favorable to employment creation than others (capital subsidies, for instance,
6may have an ambiguous e⁄ect on labor demand if capital and labor are substitutes in the indus-
tries a⁄ected by the policy). The success of enterprise zones may also depend on whether the local
context is conducive to producing results (the scarcity of land in targeted areas, for instance, may
restrict opportunities for job creation). Whether studies ￿nd that enterprise zones are successful
may also depend on the geographic scope retained for the impact evaluation as neighboring areas
which could be a⁄ected by spatial spillovers may or may not be included in the analysis. Spatial
spillovers can be positive if workers in neighboring areas bene￿t from the expansion of the activity
in the EZ. This can arise from a higher labor demand in EZ or indirectly from agglomeration
economies bene￿ting to ￿rms in neighboring municipalities which may open additional job posi-
tions. A ￿positive￿externality on non-EZ areas may also occur if the policy adversely leads to the
stigmatization of EZ residents, with employers discriminating against EZ residents and becoming
more likely to hire workers residing outside the EZ. Alternatively, negative spillovers may arise if
jobs are relocated away from neighboring areas, or if some substitution of non-EZ jobs with EZ
jobs occur.
These issues clearly make the evaluation of EZ programs a key but intricate empirical matter
and explain the relatively abundant and mixed literature on the topic (see Peters and Fisher,
2004, and Hirasuna and Michael, 2005, for recent surveys). The main usual challenge in such
evaluations is to address selection issues in the designation of areas and this requires resorting
to quasi-experimental techniques using panel data for instance to control for local unobserved
heterogeneity as in the present paper.
In the US, both the econometric evaluations of state EZ programs already reported in the
above-mentioned surveys and the more recent economic literature provide mixed results. We re-
strict our discussion below to the most recent studies on the e⁄ect on employment which resort to
now standard econometric tools used for evaluation. Elvery (2009) who studies the EZ programs
in California and Florida, ￿nds no evidence that enterprise zones have a⁄ected the individual prob-
7ability of employment for zone residents. Results are more nuanced in Bondonio and Greenbaum
(2007) who focus on the e⁄ects of enterprise zone programs in ten States and Washington, DC and
separately evaluate the e⁄ects of the EZ program on new, existing, and vanishing establishments.
They ￿nd that enterprise zone programs increase employment in new establishments in spite of
being o⁄set by the accelerated loss of employment in vanishing establishments. They are also able
to identify which features of the programs have greater positive impacts on existing businesses,
stressing the role of incentives tied to job creation and of strategic local development plans.
Earlier ￿ndings by O￿ Keefe (2004) on the California program report evidence of a transitory
e⁄ect on employment in targeted zones. This result is challenged and contradicted by Neumark and
Kolko (2010) who resort to a ￿ner geographic scale of analysis. Checking whether establishments
are located within precise street boundaries of enterprise zones over the 1992-2004 period, they
￿nd that the e⁄ect of Californian enterprise zones on employment is insigni￿cant both in the short
and the long run.
Since 1994, federal programs have complemented the enterprise zone policies that were ini-
tiated by states and their evaluations are reported in several studies. Busso and Kline (2008),
in particular, compare census tracts in designated zones with tracts in empowerment zones that
were rejected by the program (according to a competitive process) or which ended up designated
only at a later date.2 They ￿nd that empowerment zone programs had a positive e⁄ect on local
employment and a negative e⁄ect on the local poverty rate. Obviously, the validity of these results
hinges upon the comparability of selected and non-selected zones. This is challenged by Hanson
(2009) who argues that zone designation might have been endogenous. When instrumenting em-
powerment zone designation by political variables, the empowerment zone program is found to
have no e⁄ect on employment. Finally, Ham, Swenson, Imrohoroglu and Song (2011) evaluate the
e⁄ect of Enterprise Zones, Empowerment Zones, and Enterprise Community programs on targeted
2In the US, empowerment zones (and enterprise communities) refer to enterprise zones that are enacted by the
Federal government as opposed to the States.
8areas with various double-di⁄erence methods using the 1980, 1990 and 2000 census tract data and
addressing selection issues. Their results are overall supportive of these three programs which, in
particular, decrease the unemployment rate in targeted areas.
2.2 Enterprise zones in France
France launched its ￿rst enterprise zone program on January 1, 1997 by creating 44 enterprise
zones (Zones Franches Urbaines in French), among which 38 are located in metropolitan France,
and 9 in the Paris region.3 Figures from the 1999 Census of the Population indicate that the 9
enterprise zones in the Paris region hosted about 220,000 inhabitants, i.e. 2% of the population of
the region. They also accounted for a signi￿cant portion of the population in the municipalities
in which they are located (between 22% and 68%). Enterprise zones are the third and smallest
level of a nested three-tier zoning system of distressed areas around which France organizes its
urban policy interventions. While the ￿rst and second tier are mostly the focus of social programs
and urban revitalization projects, the third tier areas are the most distressed and were aimed as
speci￿c targets of the French EZ program (see DIV, 2004, for more details).
The selection of those areas was clearly not random. Municipalities or groups of municipalities
had to apply to the program and projects were selected taking into account their ranking given
by a synthetic indicator. This indicator, which has never publicly released, aggregates ￿ve criteria
based on the population of the proposed zone, its unemployment rate, the proportion of youngsters
(less than 25 years old), the proportion of workers with no skill, and the so-called ￿￿scal potential￿
3The 9 targeted neighborhoods in the Paris region are located within or across 13 municipalities. The list is as
follows: Beauval / La Pierre Collinet (in the municipality of Meaux), Zup de Surville (in Montereau-Fault-Yonne),
Le Val FourrØ (in Mantes-la-Jolie), Cinq Quartiers (in Les Mureaux), La Grande Borne (in Grigny and Viry-
Ch￿tillon), Quartier Nord (in Bondy), Grand Ensemble (in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil), Le Bois L￿ AbbØ /
Les Mordacs (in Champigny-sur-Marne and ChenneviŁres-sur-Marne), Dame Blanche Nord-Ouest / La Muette /
Les Doucettes (in Garges-lŁs-Gonesse and Sarcelles).
9of the municipality or of the municipalities in which the zone is located.4 Nevertheless, the views
of local and centralized government representatives who intervened in the geographic delimitation
of the zones also played a role in the selection process. After application of the criteria and
consideration of local interests, enterprise zones ended up being large neighborhoods of at least
10,000 inhabitants that had particularly severe unemployment problems.
The ￿scal incentives were uniform across the country and consisted in a series of tax reliefs on
property holding, corporate income, and above all on wages (see DIV, 2004, for more details).5
The key measure was that ￿rms needed to hire at least 20% of their labor force locally (after the
third worker hired) in order to be exempted from wage taxes (i.e to be relieved from employers￿
contributions to the national health insurance and pension system). This is a signi￿cant exemption
that represents around 30% of the gross wage. Under the policy, an employer paying a worker
the minimum wage (a net monthly wage of approximately 800 Euros in 1997) would be exempted
from additionally paying a wage tax of approximately 340 Euros every month. These exemptions
were meant to be temporary and were more advantageous for small ￿rms (i.e. for establishments
with less than 5 salaried workers) which bene￿ted from a 9-year rather than a 5-year exemption
completed by a 3-year degressive exemption. The program was meant to last until January 1, 2002
but was eventually extended beyond that date.
Surprisingly, no evaluation of the French enterprise zone program was initially planned and
descriptive studies which were subsequently carried out by di⁄erent public authorities, yielded
4The ￿￿scal potential￿is the ￿ctive local amount of taxes that would be collected if local tax rates were uniform
across all municipalities in France. The formula of the synthetic indicator for a given area is the product of the
￿rst four criteria computed at the area level divided by the ￿fth criterium computed for the municipality where
the area is located (see DIV, 2004).
5Exemptions concern the speci￿c following taxes: taxe professionnelle (business rate), imp￿t sur les bØnØ￿ces
(pro￿t tax), taxe fonciŁre (property tax), cotisations sociales personnelles maladie et maternitØ (individual health
insurance contributions) and charges sociales patronales (employers￿social security contribution). The two latter
categories constitute the ￿wage tax￿and exemptions from the wage tax represented 48% of the e123 million that
the policy cost in its ￿rst year of implementation (DIV, 2001).
10opposite conclusions from ￿no e⁄ect￿to ￿considerable e⁄ects￿(DIV, 2001, AndrØ, 2002, Ernst,
2007, Gilli, 2006 and ThØlot, 2004). An econometric evaluation of enterprise zones is provided by
Rathelot and Sillard (2009) who focus on the e⁄ect of enterprise zones on establishment creation
and salaried employment in the next round of EZ creation in 2004, whereby some areas already
zoned for urban revitalization projects became designated as enterprise zones (moving from the
second to the third tier of the zoning system of distressed areas). Using di⁄erence in di⁄erences
techniques, they ￿nd that enterprise zones had only a modest e⁄ect on the creation of establish-
ments and salaried jobs. Our study departs from theirs in two important respects. First, we focus
on the creation of the ￿rst wave of enterprise zones in 1997. This enables us to measure the whole
e⁄ect of the enterprise zone creation rather than just an incremental e⁄ect of the territorial policy.
Secondly, we focus on the e⁄ect of the policy on local unemployment rather than on local jobs
(which may partly bene￿t non-residents). To this end, we use individual data on unemployment
rather than ￿rm data on employment.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We focus on the Paris region, which roughly corresponds to the Paris metropolitan area. This
region of 10.9 million people is subdivided into 1,300 municipalities including the 20 subdistricts
of the city of Paris. These municipalities have very di⁄erent population sizes that range from
225,000 residents in the most populous Parisian subdistrict to small villages located some 80 km
away from the city center (Source: 1999 Census of the Population).
We use the historical ￿le of job applicants to the National Agency for Employment (￿Agence
Nationale pour l￿ Emploi￿ or ANPE hereafter) for the Paris region. This dataset covers the large
majority of unemployment spells in the region given that registration with the national employ-
ment agency is a prerequisite for unemployed workers to claim unemployment bene￿ts in France.6
6In the only study that we know of regarding registration with the National Agency for Employment, Blasco
11It contains information on the exact date of an application (the very day), the unemployment
duration in days, the reason for which the application came to an end, the municipality where
the individual resides, and a set of socio-economic characteristics reported upon registration with
the employment agency (age, gender, nationality, diploma, marital status, number of children and
disabilities).
We use a ￿ ow sample of unemployment spells that started between July 1989 and June 2003.
After eliminating the very few observations for which some socio-economic characteristics are
missing, we are able to reconstruct 8,831,456 unemployment spells ending in the period of interest
running from July 1993 to June 2003.7 This period includes the implementation date of the
enterprise zone program (January 1, 1997) and allows us to study the e⁄ect of enterprise zones
not only in the short run but also in the medium run. These unemployment spells may end when
the unemployed ￿nd a job, drop out of the labor force, leave unemployment for an unknown reason
or when the spell is right censored. Given the focus of the paper, we will mainly study exits that
end with ￿nding a job, all other exits being treated as right-censoring in the analysis.
Regarding the geographic scale of analysis, given that enterprise zones are clusters of a signif-
icant size within or across municipalities, it would be desirable to try to detect the e⁄ect of the
policy at the level of an enterprise zone as well as on neighboring areas. Nevertheless, our data
does not allow us to work at this ￿ne level of disaggregation and our approach retains municipal-
ities as our spatial unit of analysis. Municipalities have on average twice the population of the
EZ they contain. Any aggregate e⁄ect at the municipality level will measure the e⁄ect of local job
creation net of within-municipality transfers.
and Fontaine (2010) ￿nd that 61% of unemployed workers in the French Labor Force Survey report that they are
registered. The authors acknowledge that the true percentage could be signi￿cantly higher given that their ￿gure
is for self-reports and de￿nitions of unemployment in the two sources might di⁄er. In addition, the mobility of
unemployed does not seem to be a key issue as discussed in Gobillon et al. (2011).
7We arti￿cially censored the few spells which lasted longer than four years. This is because the assumptions
underlying our duration model described below are unlikely to be satis￿ed for very long spells.
12Descriptive statistics on the number of unemployed workers at risk and the number of exits to
a job are reported by semester in Table 1 for the whole region (￿rst two columns). The number
of unemployed workers at risk is nearly constant from 1993 to 1999 and then decreases before
increasing again in 2001. This is consistent with a sharp decrease in the unemployment rate after
1999. The number of exits to a job does not follow exactly the same pattern as the decrease occurs
sooner, in 1996. Over the whole period, the proportion of exits to a job decreases from 11:2% to
7:2%.
[Insert Table 1]
We also reported in Table 1 the same statistics for municipalities whose size is in the 8,000-
100,000 range as our working sample is restricted to that range in the policy evaluation section.8
It contains all treated municipalities and comprises at this stage 271 municipalities (258 controls
and 13 treatments). There are no noticeable di⁄erences between this restricted sample and the
full sample. Roughly speaking, an average of 90,000 unemployed workers ￿nd a job each semester
and this corresponds to about 300 exits per semester in each municipality. In view of these ￿gures,
we chose semesters as the time intervals in our analysis since using shorter periods would have
implied too much variability due to small sample size.
The raw data used in the evaluation of the EZ program are described in Figure 1. This ￿gure
reports the evolution of the exit rates in the sample of treated municipalities and in three control
groups: a sample composed by non-treated municipalities between 8,000 and 100,000, and two
subsamples of that group made of municipalities located at a distance within 5 kilometers, or
within a band of 5 to 10 kilometers around an EZ. For readability, we drew a vertical line at
8The reason for excluding the municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants is that this group includes Paris inner
districts and one close neighbor, Boulogne-Billancourt, which are at no risk of being selected because of their
a› uence. We chose the lower bound of 8,000 as it allows us to include neighbors of treated municipalities under
di⁄erent de￿nitions of the control group. We do not know the identity of applicants to the program who were not
selected.
13semester 8 (￿rst semester of 1997) when the policy started to be implemented. The curves for the
control groups are broadly decreasing and exhibit parallel trends throughout the period. The curve
for the treatment group slightly diverges from the trends observed for the control municipalities
between semesters 1 and 12 (second semester of 1993 to ￿rst semester of 1999). In particular, the
exit rate to a job remains ￿ at in the treatment group between semesters 7 and 8 (second semester
of 1996 and ￿rst semester of 1997) when the policy enters into e⁄ect whereas it is decreasing in the
control groups. The estimation of the treatment parameter that we undertake in the remaining
sections of the paper is a way of formalizing and testing that these diverging trends are statistically
signi￿cant.
[Insert Figure 1]
None of these di⁄erences appears in the evolution of exit rates to non-employment and the evo-
lution of exit rates for unknown reasons (see our working paper, Gobillon, Magnac and Selod,
2010).
Lastly, Figure 2 represents the evolution of exit rates to a job, distinguishing between two
groups of municipalities depending on the share of their population residing in the enterprise
zone. The "￿ attening" e⁄ect between semester 7 (before treatment) and semester 8 (after treat-
ment) which was noticeable in Figure 1, is much more pronounced in municipalities in which the
enterprise zone hosts a larger fraction of the population. As a matter of fact, rates of exit to a job
even increased in those municipalities. This is suggestive of a local e⁄ect on unemployment spells
that is more concentrated in EZs than in the non-EZ parts of the same municipalities.
[Insert Figure 2 ]
4 The identi￿cation strategy
As our raw data consists of individual unemployment spells observed over time, we rely on a
two-stage approach to measure the e⁄ect of the EZ program. In a ￿rst stage, we start by esti-
14mating semester-speci￿c municipality e⁄ects on the propensity to ￿nd a job while netting out the
economic conditions (using calendar time e⁄ects) and the e⁄ects of observed individual character-
istics (gender, age, nationality, diploma, family structure, disability). These municipality e⁄ects
measure the chances of ￿nding a job for unemployed workers in each municipality during each
semester over the period, all other things being equal. In a second stage, we then resort to various
evaluation techniques to compare the evolution of these estimated municipality e⁄ects before and
after the implementation of the policy between treated municipalities and various control groups
of other municipalities.
Our identi￿cation strategy for the causal e⁄ects of EZs on the propensity of unemployed workers
located in treated municipalities to ￿nd a job relies on constructing data at the municipality level
that measure the easiness with which residents exit from unemployment. The use of individual data
in the estimation of municipality e⁄ects allows to control for municipality composition e⁄ects and
to account for right censoring. Our approach aims at reducing the extent of the correlation between
municipality unobservables in the trends of unemployment exits and municipality unobservables
a⁄ecting selection into treatment. This in turn justi￿es our empirical strategy in the second stage
that is based on the assumption that treated municipalities are selected on observables only. We
also check that our results are robust to key issues such as the variation in the de￿nition of control
groups, a change in the periods of observation, a change in the weighting scheme or the selection
of observations according to propensity scores, the inclusion of various additional variables such
as entry rates or lagged endogeneous variables, and ￿nally the presence of placebo e⁄ects.
To implement this strategy, we ￿rst brie￿ y explain how we estimate the semester-speci￿c
municipality e⁄ects and discuss the arguments underlying our de￿nition of treatment and control
groups. Our parameter of interest being the average treatment on the treated, we then explicit
our identifying restrictions and our estimation strategy.
154.1 Estimating the municipality e⁄ects
We follow the approach described in the methodology paper (Gobillon et al., 2011) which extended
the set-up proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) of Strati￿ed Partial Likelihood Estimation
(SPLE) to the estimation of unemployment duration models. It used a single ￿ ow sample and
as its main empirical result, decomposed the variance of local e⁄ects explaining unemployment
duration in terms of various factors such as education and nationality. In the present paper in
contrast, we apply this methodology to a policy impact evaluation, relying on 20 semester speci￿c
samples to estimate 20 semester speci￿c e⁄ects for each municipality (7 semesters before and 13
after the policy implementation).
We start from the speci￿cation of the proportional hazard model of the duration d of an
unemployment spell until an exit to a job:
￿(djXi;j (i)) = ￿
j(i)
s ￿(d)exp(Xi￿s) (1)
in which Xi are individual covariates and calendar time dummies, j(i) is the municipality of resi-
dence for individual i, parameters ￿j
s are semester speci￿c municipality e⁄ects which ￿ exibly a⁄ect
the hazard function and constitute the dependent outcome of the EZ program at the evaluation
stage,9 function ￿(d) is the baseline hazard function in the region, and ￿s are semester-speci￿c
coe¢ cients.
As the estimation uses a generalization of Cox Partial Likelihood, parameters ￿s are directly
estimated by partial likelihood methods that are tractable in spite of millions of observations
and hundreds of municipality e⁄ects. The estimation proceeds by using risk sets de￿ned in each
semester. Moreover, using the Breslow estimator, one can then recover the estimates of the semester
and municipality speci￿c baseline hazard function ￿j
s￿(d). These estimates are further used to
￿nally recover estimates of ￿j
s or rather their logarithm, log(￿j
s), which measure the propensity of
9What follows is a very brief description of the construction of our working samples. The full description of the
procedure is detailed in an Appendix available upon request and in the working paper Gobillon et al. (2010).
16unemployed workers to ￿nd a job in each municipality j in each semester s.10
4.2 De￿nitions of treatment and control groups
We estimate the e⁄ect of the EZ program using various dates before and after the creation of EZs,
and using various treatment and control groups. The treatment group is composed of municipali-
ties which comprise an enterprise zone. In robustness checks we depart from this construction and
distinguish municipalities for which enterprise zones represent a large section of their population
(more than 50%) from the other treated municipalities. Later on, we also modify the treatment
group by including neighbors of treated municipalities.
When de￿ning the control group, there is a potential con￿ ict between two objectives. The
￿rst objective is to retain municipalities that are similar to those in the treatment group along
various dimensions. The second objective is to avoid contamination of the e⁄ects through spatial
spillovers (Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and van Reenen, 2004). To address the trade-o⁄between
these two objectives, we develop various empirical strategies controlling for di⁄erent municipality
variables and experimenting with di⁄erent ways of constructing the control group.
We start by forcing the control group to comprise municipalities that are the closest to those in
the treatment group in the space of characteristics and this includes neighbors of treated munic-
ipalities. Furthermore, population size has a very di⁄erent support in the treatment and control
groups since the non-treated group comprises many small and very small municipalities (less than
1,000 inhabitants) while the smallest treated municipality has 17,500 residents. To address this
issue, as already explained above, we choose to restrict the control group to municipalities whose
population is between 8,000 and 100,000. Moreover, we estimate propensity scores of being des-
10Computing standard errors at the second stage might seem to be a tedious task. We showed however in
Gobillon et al. (2011) that taking into account the estimated correlations between the estimates of semester-
speci￿c municipality e⁄ects had almost no impact at the second stage. What matters is their variance and our
robust estimates take care of the multiple step nature of the procedure.
17ignated as a municipality comprising an EZ and then restrict the control group to contain only
municipalities whose estimated propensity score belongs to the same support as that of treated
municipalities. Note that this selection changes the de￿nition of the treatment parameter of in-
terest which now refers to municipalities which have ultimately been included in the working
sample.
Moreover, it is important to note that the probability of treatment for a given municipality is
never 0 or 1 for several reasons. First, we use municipality rather than neighborhood characteris-
tics, second the selection indicator calculated by public authorities to select EZ was not publicly
released and ￿nally the designation process was imperfect. Since political actors had a say in
the designation of enterprise zones, the selection process was only partly based on the ranking
according to the aggregate indicator. It also depended on political in￿ uence and on the desire of
policy makers to spread out enterprize zones throughout the region. Both reasons make it easier
to ￿nd control municipalities whose characteristics are similar to those that are treated.
4.3 Identi￿cation and Estimation of the Policy E⁄ect
We can now turn to the de￿nition of the impact of enterprise zones on the semester speci￿c
municipality e⁄ects ￿j
s estimated in the ￿rst stage described above. These e⁄ects measure the
facility with which the unemployed ￿nd a job in municipality j at semester s. We distinguish
semesters before the creation of enterprise zones (i.e. between the second semester of 1993 and
the second semester of 1996) that we generically denote s0 and semesters after the creation of
EZs (i.e. between the ￿rst semester of 1997 and the ￿rst semester of 2003) that we generically
denote s1. Using the notations of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), denote ln￿j
s1 (1) the (logarithm
of) municipality e⁄ect in the case in which municipality j is treated. It is the estimated e⁄ect in
the case the municipality comprises an enterprise zone in semester s1 and the counterfactual if the
municipality does not host an enterprise zone in semester s1. Similarly, the municipality e⁄ect is
18denoted ln￿j
s1 (0) when municipality j does not contain an enterprise zone in semester s1.
Denote Zj
s1 the treatment indicator, a dummy variable which indicates whether municipality
j actually comprises an enterprise zone from 1997 onwards. The observed municipality e⁄ect in
















The average e⁄ect of enterprise zone designation on unemployment exits in municipalities which




















in this expression is a
counterfactual (see, for instance, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
To estimate parameter ￿; we restrict ourselves to linear models of treatment e⁄ects given that
the number of treated and control municipalities are quite small (see below). Second, simple
di⁄erence in di⁄erence or within estimates of models in which municipality e⁄ects are regressed
on a treatment indicator and municipality covariates are not robust to key issues such as the time
variability of the treatment e⁄ect (Gobillon et al. 2010). Our preferred speci￿cation is the random











where ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator, variable Zj
s is the dummy for treatment status, Xj are
some municipality characteristics (which do not vary across time in our database), uj
s is an error
term (including the sampling error on the left-hand side variable due to ￿rst-stage estimation)
and parameters ￿￿
s denote semester dummies. The coe¢ cient ￿ is the average treatment on the
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19an assumption which was exploited by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). This model amounts
to considering that municipalities could have heterogeneous trends in their exit rates although
this heterogeneity is a⁄ected by observables only. This approach belongs to matching di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erences methods as described by Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009). In practice, to control for
municipality heterogeneity, we included in (3) the propensity score modelling the probability of
being designated as a EZ instead of municipality characteristics. Using an orthogonality argument














which shows that the explanatory variables can be replaced by the propensity score p(Xj) in
regression (3) to reduce dimensionality, although we also experimented with the full set of variables
(see Gobillon et al., 2010).
Finally, we also used weights to account for the diversity of municipalities. A natural weight
to be used is the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality at the
beginning of each semester. We also checked the robustness of the results using alternative weights
such as the inverse of the estimated standard error of the estimate [ ln￿
j
s:
5 Results of the policy evaluation
We performed the ￿rst-stage estimation by maximizing the partial likelihood function for all
semesters between the second semester of 1993 and the ￿rst semester of 2003. We do not report
these results here (see Gobillon et al., 2010, for more details) and rather concentrate on the
results of the evaluation of the creation of enterprise zones on January 1st 1997. We ￿rst report
the estimation of the propensity score at the municipality level. We then present estimates of the
policy e⁄ect and provide various robustness checks.
205.1 Describing the treated municipalities: the propensity score
We now describe the municipality characteristics that determine the creation of an enterprise
zone and that will allow us to construct the propensity score. We estimate a Probit model of EZ
designation as a function of municipality control variables among which are measures of physical
job accessibility, the municipal composition of the population in terms of nationality or education,
the rate of unemployment, the proportion of young adults, and household income (proxying for the
￿scal potential). We also include in the speci￿cation the smallest distance to another municipality
comprising an enterprise zone. This is to account for the will of authorities to distribute enterprise
zones more or less evenly throughout the region.11 Results of weighted Probit estimations where
the weights are the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality are
reported in Table 2.
The results of our benchmark weighted Probit speci￿cation in which weights are the (square
root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality appear in the ￿rst column of Table
2 although less parsimonious speci￿cations were also estimated (see the notes below this Table).
Unweighted estimation results are very similar (column 3).
[Insert Table 2]
In line with the selection criteria, the larger the average household income in the municipality or the
smaller the proportion of persons without a high school diploma in the municipality, the less likely
the municipality comprises an enterprise zone although the latter e⁄ect is hardly signi￿cant. The
higher the proportion of individuals below 25 years of age or the larger the size of the population,
the larger the probability that the municipality contains an enterprise zone. In terms of distance,
the larger the distance to a designated municipality or the larger the density of jobs attainable in
less than 60 minutes by private vehicle, the less likely it is that the municipality will be endowed
11We checked endogeneity issues by experimenting with the second-lowest distance as an instrument. It hardly
a⁄ected results.
21with an enterprise zone. This is consistent with the targeting of places with relatively lower job
accessibility. The distance to the nearest EZ is not signi￿cant. In line with Hanson (2009), we
also experimented with political variables which are the frequencies of votes for political parties.
Even though municipalities whose townhalls were administered by politicians belonging to the
governing party at the time of EZ designation were more likely to be selected, the e⁄ect is not
signi￿cant and we chose not to include these variables in the ￿nal speci￿cation.
We also experimented with an alternative whose results are reported in the second column of
Table 2. We included a variable equal to the endogenous outcome (i.e. the municipality e⁄ects)
averaged over semesters prior to policy implementation. The e⁄ect is positive although it is at the
limit of signi￿cance. This means that municipalities chosen to include an enterprise zone are also
those where it is easier for unemployed workers to ￿nd a job holding constant the characteristics
that explain the treatment. This is a standard result in the evaluation literature where governments
often intervene to ￿pick winners￿(Boarnet and Bogart, 1996).
Using the results in the ￿rst column, we predict the propensity score for each municipality.
It interestingly reveals that the supports of the predicted propensity scores in the treated and
control groups di⁄er quite markedly as shown in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3]
The smallest predicted probability in the treatment group is equal to 0.08%, a low score which
is consistent with political tampering in designation. In order to satisfy the common support
condition (Smith and Todd, 2005), we further restrict the control group to municipalities whose
predicted propensity scores are larger than the value 0.04% (see Table 3). This restriction shrinks
the control group by a factor of 2 and it now includes 135 municipalities (instead of 258), which
is about ten times the number of treated municipalities (13). We will later test the robustness of
our results to more or less restrictive selections.
Using this allocation, we computed the averages of explanatory variables in the treatment and
22control groups to assess whether those groups are balanced and we report these averages in Table
4.
[Insert Table 4]
Since the treatment group is small, it seems di¢ cult to report these averages in strata de￿ned
by the propensity score levels (Smith and Todd, 2005). We rather report them globally even if
results are less easy to interpret. The covariates of interest seem to be balanced in the two sub-
samples except for two variables: the proportion of college graduates and household income. This
explains the di⁄erences in the propensity score averages between the control and treatment group.
Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient of designated municipalities in linear regressions of those covariates
on the propensity score and the designation indicator is not signi￿cant even at the 10% level which
indicates that samples are approximately balanced.
5.2 The evaluation of the policy
A useful benchmark for our evaluation is the estimated treatment e⁄ect obtained when using
as outcome variable the raw entry rates into unemployment as in Papke (1994) and the three
raw exit rates from unemployment (i.e. the rates of exit to a job, to non-employment or to an
unknown reason) that we are able to construct from our data. The entry rate (resp. an exit
rate) is de￿ned as the number of unemployed workers entering (resp. exiting) in a given semester
divided by the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period. The results using
raw rates should be compared with those obtained when applying our more sophisticated method
that purges exit rates to a job from individual characteristics and takes into account the usual
censorships that a⁄ect unemployment data. This is a useful benchmark since policy analysts often
resort to raw rates for policy evaluation. Table 5 reports the estimation results of the random
growth equation (3) using raw rates correcting for the within-municipality autocorrelation of
shocks between semesters by FGLS using a constant unrestricted within-municipality covariance
23matrix.
[Insert Table 5]
In column 1, the parameter which measures the e⁄ect of the treatment on the log-entry rates in
unemployment is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Column 2 reports the e⁄ect of the treatment
on the log-exit rates out of unemployment to a job, our parameter of interest. It is signi￿cantly
positive and equal to .040. The other raw exit rates are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the treatment
and this will be commented later on.
Using the same estimation method as in the benchmark, Table 6 reports our main estimation
results using the semester speci￿c municipality e⁄ects purged from observed individual hetero-
geneity in the ￿rst stage as explained in section 4.1. We present results that we obtain when
varying the range of semesters used in the estimations.12
[Insert Table 6]
The ￿rst column reports the results of our preferred speci￿cation since this speci￿cation is robust
to various changes in the underlying construction and seems to be a conservative estimate. The
estimated treatment parameter is equal to .031 and is signi￿cant at the 5% level. This e⁄ect is
quite small since it implies that the rate of exit to a job increased by a meagre 3% when the
policy was implemented. Given that there are roughly 300 exits each semester on average in a
municipality in the considered range of population size, the policy amounts to generating about
10 new exits per semester only. This estimate is slightly lower but comparable to the benchmark
using raw rates. This small e⁄ect can probably be interpreted as an indication that job reallocation
within municipalities may be relatively large, that there is possibly little substitution of labor to
capital, and that any possibly generated agglomeration e⁄ects are not favorable to hiring.
12We do not report the estimated semester e⁄ects which reproduce closely the raw trends in the data. Nor do we
correct standard errors for the replacement of the true propensity score by an estimator which usually marginally
a⁄ects standard errors.
24In the second column we further restrict the period of evaluation, keeping only two semesters
before the reform and two semesters after the reform. The estimate remains signi￿cant and stands
at .042. If we further restrict the analysis to the period at which the reform was implemented,
the estimate is equal to .035 although it becomes insigni￿cant, probably because of the smaller
number of observations.13
Interestingly, we can distinguish between treated municipalities according to the proportion of
the municipality population which resides within the enterprise zone. Speci￿cally, we included in
our preferred speci￿cation (column 1) an indicator that the proportion of the population living
in the enterprise zone in the treated municipality is below 50%. The result is striking since the
treatment parameter estimate is now equal to .057 instead of .031 and is signi￿cant at a 1% level
while the treatment e⁄ect in municipalities in which a small proportion of the population lives
in an enterprise zone is also positive (.016=.057-.041) but becomes insigni￿cant. The dilution of
the e⁄ect will be con￿rmed below when changing the treatment de￿nition. It indicates that the
e⁄ect of the policy is very localized with probably little spillover outside the EZ, an issue that we
further investigate below.
Finally, we tested for spatial correlation and its pattern is very irregular and certaily not
signi￿cant beyond 10 kilometers. Since correcting standard errors for the presence of random
e⁄ects at the level of the ￿dØpartement￿(county equivalent) had a marginal impact, we chose to
neglect these corrections.
5.3 Spillover e⁄ects and changes in treatment and control groups
We now investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities, which may
be either positive or negative as mentioned earlier. We began with changing the composition of
the control group. We selected municipalities in the control group depending on their distance
13The treatment variable is very much correlated with the propensity score and when we omit the latter, the
estimate increases to .058 and is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
25to a treated municipality. We used "as-the-crow-￿ ies" distance between municipality centres and
experimented with three distance thresholds at 5, 10 and 15 kilometers. We ￿rst restricted the
previous control group to municipalities whose center is farther than 5 kilometers of the center
of a treated municipality (respectively 10 and 15 kilometers). Second, we restricted the control
group to municipalities whose center is within 5 kilometers of the center of a treated municipality
(respectively 10 and 15). Table 7 reports the corresponding results.
[Insert Table 7]
The evidence of spillover e⁄ects to neighboring municipalities is weak. In all but one of these ex-
periments, the estimates of the treatment parameter remains around .03 and their standard errors
remain constant. The only case in which the estimate becomes hardly distinguishable from zero is
when the control group is restricted to municipalities outside the 15 km range of a treated munic-
ipality. In our opinion, however, the assumption (4) that these municipalities are experimenting
the same trends in unemployment as the treated municipalities becomes unsustainable since labor
market conditions in distant municipalities are likely to be di⁄erent. These various estimations
also con￿rm that spatial correlation should not be an important concern since standard errors are
in most cases not a⁄ected by these variants.
We also experimented with changes in the de￿nition of the treatment group. Instead of retain-
ing the municipalities comprising an enterprise zone only, we also retained their neighbors at a
distance of less than 2 kilometers (respectively at a distance of less than 3 kilometers). The number
of potentially treated municipalities increases from 13 to 24 treated municipalities (respectively
51). Table 8 reports the corresponding results. It is striking that in both cases the estimated treat-
ment parameter value drops by 2/3 and is no longer signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. It con￿rms
that the creation of an enterprise zone has a very localized e⁄ect on the unemployment exit rate
to a job and has no signi￿cant positive spillover e⁄ects on neighboring municipalities.
[Insert Table 8]
265.4 Other robustness checks
We also performed other robustness checks of our results. First, we modi￿ed the whole procedure
so as to consider in the estimation of the propensity score the role of the before treatment average of
the endogenous variable (as in the second column of Table 2). Second, we varied the municipality-
and-semester speci￿c weights that we used in the estimation. Instead of using the square root of
the number of unemployed workers in the municipality at the beginning of the semester, we either
used the inverse standard errors of the estimates of the left-hand side variable as provided by the
￿rst-stage estimates or no weights at all. These results are available in Gobillon et al. (2010) and
they are hardly di⁄erent from those obtained for the main speci￿cation and, if anything, estimates
of the treatment parameter become larger.
To evaluate the implications of our support assumptions, we change the lower threshold for
inclusion of municipalities in the control group according to their estimated propensity score. We
repeated the experiment and varied this (lower) threshold from 0.005 to 0.15 without a⁄ecting
the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient by much. We also experimented with modifying the
treatment group by leaving one treated municipality out and re-running 13 di⁄erent estimations.
There is one outlier in this experiment in the sense that if we leave this municipality out the
estimated e⁄ect becomes larger (.43) and very signi￿cant. It is true that leaving out the largest
propensity scores municipalities (see Table 3) can decrease by 15% the estimated e⁄ect but it is
not systematic. Keeping the 13 treated municipalities in the sample is thus reasonable and seems
to give a somewhat conservative estimate.
Another issue is that although the construction of the semester-speci￿c municipality e⁄ects
purges exit rates to jobs from individual characteristics, it does a poorer job at controlling for
entry e⁄ects because of identi￿cation issues. We included yearly and monthly dummies in the
￿rst stage estimation even though identi￿cation of these parameters could be fragile. To address
the issue, we re-estimated our preferred speci￿cation (see ￿rst column of Table 6) controlling for
27semester and municipality speci￿c entry rates. Although this variable has a signi￿cant positive
e⁄ect, the estimate of the treatment e⁄ect is hardly a⁄ected.
Our estimates might also re￿ ect that some ￿rms delayed hiring during the last semester of
1996 in order to bene￿t from the policy in the following semester. As suggested by Manning and
Pischke (2006) to measure placebo e⁄ects as well, we included in the speci￿cation an indicator
for the lagged treatment e⁄ect. If the policy is anticipated and employers delay hiring decisions,
a negative e⁄ect could be observed. The lagged treatment e⁄ect is found to be not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero, suggesting no such behavior, and its inclusion does not a⁄ect the estimated
treatment parameter.
Evidence gathered in Table 5 runs against an argument advanced by Elverly (2009) about
indirect e⁄ects of employment zones. The local labor market in treated municipalities would
become more attractive after the creation of an enterprise zone and non-employed persons would
be encouraged to search for a job. This would increase the entry rate into unemployment and the
competition for jobs among the unemployed. This probably does not happen with the French EZ
program since we do not ￿nd that the treatment parameter is a⁄ected by entry rates or that entry
rates change because of the program.
Finally, the estimates of the treatment parameter for exits to non-employment and exits for
unknown reasons reported in Table 5 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero although the estimate
for exits to non-employment is quite large at the same level .039. The result that exits for unknown
reasons are not a⁄ected by the policy is important for our identi￿cation strategy. Our treatment
parameter using information on reported exits to a job only would indeed be biased if exits to a
job were concealed among the exits for unknown reasons in a way that varies between treated and
control municipalities.
286 Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper, we conducted an evaluation of the impact of the creation of enterprise zones on
the propensity of unemployed workers to ￿nd a job. Contrary to the previous literature which
usually focuses on employment growth or on the local creation of ￿rms, our choice of outcome of
interest was motivated by the fact that a main objective of the policy had indeed been to help
locals move out of unemployment (and not just to create or displace jobs which may only have
an indirect e⁄ect on the local population). This evaluation was carried out for the Paris region,
using an exhaustive dataset on job applicants registered at the French National Unemployment
Agency, and resorting to a varied toolkit of statistical methods. We assessed whether unemployed
workers in municipalities with a newly created enterprise zone improved their chances of ￿nding
a job compared with unemployed workers living in similar municipalities but where no enterprise
zone was created.
Our main results are threefold. Firstly, in line with several studies on enterprise zones, we
showed that zone designation tended to favor municipalities with favorable unobserved character-
istics. This is not surprising given that policy makers usually tend to select places that are more
likely to carry success or choose places that gather prior favorable conditions for economic devel-
opment. Secondly, we found that the French EZ program had a small positive impact, which is
consistent with previous work on the number of local establishments in enterprise zones (Rathelot
and Sillard, 2009).
The policy had a short-run impact on the ease with which the local unemployed workers move
out of unemployment. This result is robust to a variety of speci￿cations and robustness checks
and is broadly in line with the previous works in the US that found that enterprise zones had an
impact on employment (Papke, 1994, Lynch and Zax, 2008, Ham et al., 2011), although in our
case it is rather small. On the other hand, our result contrasts with previous papers which found
that it had no impact on employment (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996, Bondonio and Engberg, 2000,
29Neumark and Kolko, 2010). Lastly, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect is very localized and may be the direct
consequence that tax rebates are given in exchange of some locals being hired.
In each municipality in our sample, while on average about 300 unemployed workers ￿nd a job
every semester, enterprise zones only help an additional group of 10 workers to ￿nd a job over the
same duration. It could be argued that this ￿gure represents a lower bound of the e⁄ect of tax
exemptions since out-of-the-labor-force residents may also have reacted to these new opportunities.
Because of missing information, some exits to a job may also have been attributed to other types
of exits from unemployment.
However, even if the true impact on job creations bene￿tting enterprise zone residents is
substantially larger than the direct e⁄ect on exits from unemployment, the overall impact is likely
to be moderate. It is also likely to be small in comparison with the huge cost associated with
the policy. In 1997, the ￿rst year of program implementation, it is estimated that the tax reliefs
associated with the policy amounted to e123 million for the whole of France. The wage tax
exemption amounted to e59 million (48% of the total of tax reliefs) and bene￿ted to 26,000 jobs
throughout the country. However, 6,000 of these jobs only were held by residents of enterprise
zones (DIV, 2001). This means that for each job held by an enterprise zone resident, almost
e10,000 were granted in wage tax exemptions, and in some case for workers who were already
employed before the start of the policy. A fortiori, the cost associated with the new hire of an
enterprise zone resident is thus greater. This argues in favor of designing possibly better targeted,
more integrated and more cost-e⁄ective policies that operate beyond the sole stimulation of labor
demand.
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33Table 1: Descriptive statistics, by semester
All municipalities Municipalities whose population is
between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990
Year Semester Nb. at risk Exit to job Nb. at risk Exit to job
1993 2 1,139,991 127,748 795,570 89,404
1994 1 1,144,764 144,094 799,234 100,743
1994 2 1,201,196 140,438 837,624 98,051
1995 1 1,153,306 140,389 802,327 98,364
1995 2 1,168,106 135,768 813,158 94,885
1996 1 1,131,391 139,655 790,664 97,521
1996 2 1,171,410 123,759 818,334 86,350
1997 1 1,111,631 124,091 778,704 86,490
1997 2 1,140,782 111,852 800,008 77,843
1998 1 1,090,633 114,619 768,067 79,910
1998 2 1,122,653 102,765 791,357 71,850
1999 1 1,085,102 105,976 765,103 73,381
1999 2 1,101,209 100,188 776,471 70,061
2000 1 1,026,096 103,761 723,854 72,330
2000 2 970,200 95,736 687,451 67,035
2001 1 905,301 86,233 640,140 60,183
2001 2 936,464 76,388 661,347 53,769
2002 1 960,918 77,619 678,313 54,336
2002 2 1,061,983 79,513 747,329 55,657
2003 1 1,074,594 77,036 755,211 53,521
Nb. at risk: number of unemployed workers whose unemployment spell began within the four-year period before
the beginning of the semester and who are at risk at least one day during the semester.
Exit to job: number of unemployed workers exiting to a job during the period.
34Table 2: Propensity score: eect of municipality characteristics
on the probability of designation of an enterprise zone
Inclusion of past No weights
municipality eect
Job density, 60 minutes by private vehicle -3.999* -3.357 -4.171*
(2.109) (2.260) (2.298)
Proportion of no diploma 37.779* 33.447 24.029
(22.249) (23.998) (22.865)
Proportion of technical diplomas 20.998 5.860 0.974
(28.215) (31.527) (28.900)
Proportion of college diplomas 38.978 27.180 17.299
(29.889) (32.809) (31.336)
Distance to the nearest EZ -0.027 -0.033 -0.035
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Proportion of individuals below 25 in 1990 17.125*** 14.890*** 11.834**
(5.156) (5.320) (5.256)
Population in 1990 0.021** 0.022** 0.019*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Average net household income in 96 -4.975*** -5.140*** -2.033
(1.563) (1.636) (1.593)
Past municipality eect in exit to job 4.014*
(2.323)
Constant -32.115 -1.447 -16.526
(21.818) (29.243) (22.537)
Nb. observations 271 271 271
Pseudo-R2 .542 .561 .477
Note: ***: signicant at 1% level; **: signicant at 5% level; *: signicant at 10% level.
The specication is a probit model with the dependent variable being a dummy equal to one if the municipality
is designated to receive an EZ (and zero otherwise). The sample is restricted to municipalities with a population
between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. The rst and second columns are weighted by the square root of the number
of unemployed workers at risk at the beginning of period 8 (1st semester of 1997), and the third column is not
weighted. Past municipality eect refers to the average of municipality eects in previous semesters, as estimated
in the 1st stage of SPLE (the specication being given by equation 1).
We also used alternative specications including in the set of explanatory variables, for instance: the job density
within a 60' radius by public transport, the unemployment rate in 1990, the proportions of Europeans (French
excluded), North Africans, Subsaharan Africans and other nationalities. The estimated coecients were not
signicant and a Chi-square test did not reject the absence of joint signicance. Consequently, we dropped these
variables from the specication.
35Table 3: Frequency of non-treated municipalities by propensity score bracket
















Note: The observation unit is a municipality between 8,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. The propensity score
is computed as the predicted probability of a municipality to be designated, the predicted probability being
obtained from a probit model which estimated coecients are reported in Table 2, column (1). Each bracket
bound corresponds to the propensity score of a treated municipality, where treated municipalities have been
sorted by propensity score in ascending order.
36Table 4: Average of municipality characteristics in treatment and control groups
Treatment group Control group,
propensity score > .005
Job density, 60 minutes by public transport .838 .850
(.119) (.119)
Proportion of no diploma .536 .465
(.041) (.074)
Proportion of technical diplomas .222 .219
(.009) (.031)
Proportion of college diplomas .122 .179
(.025) (.075)
Distance to the nearest EZ 9.074 11.016
(12.193) (8.051)
Proportion of individuals below 25 in 1990 .416 .372
(.038) (.043)
Population in 1990 45.201 43.578
(18.226) (26.357)
Average net household income in 96 .375 .509
(.087) (.125)
Number of observations 13 135
Note: The observation unit is a municipality between 8,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Only municipalities with
propensity score above .005 are considered in the control group. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis
under the means. The propensity score is computed using Table 2, column (1).
37Table 5: Eect of treatment on the logarithm of raw rates of entry and exit
Dependent variable Entry rate Exit rate Exit rate Exit rate
into unemployment to job to non-employment to unknown
EZ treatment eect .011 .040*** .039 .013
(.021) (.015) (.024) (.014)
Propensity score -.077*** -.009*** -.007* .001
(.018) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 1628 1628 1628
Note: ***: signicant at 1% level; **: signicant at 5% level; *: signicant at 10% level.
The entry rate (resp. an exit rate) is dened as the number of unemployed workers entering (resp. exiting) during
a given semester divided by the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period. The entry and
exit rates are regressed in rst dierence on the EZ treatment dummy, the propensity score and year dummies
(which are not reported here). We only keep semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 12 (1st semester
of 1999). The reported number of observations corresponds to rst-dierence observations and is thus equal to
(12   1)  149 = 1628 observations. Estimation method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted
covariance matrix.
38Table 6: Eect of designation and treatment on semester-specic municipality eects
Periods: Periods: Period: Period: Periods:
1/2 to 11/12 4/5 to 8/9 7/8 7/8 1/2 to 11/12
Specic eect for
small-proportion EZ
EZ treatment eect .031** .042** .035 .058*** .057***
(.014) (.019) (.025) (.019) (.016)
EZ treatment eect -.041**
* small-proportion EZ (.018)
Propensity score -.008* -.021* .049 -.007*
(.004) (.012) (.039) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 592 148 148 1628
Note: ***: signicant at 1% level; **: signicant at 5% level; *: signicant at 10% level. We conduct robustness
checks to changes of semesters and assess the impact of introducing a specic eect for EZ with a small proportion
of the population in the municipality. Semester-specic municipality eects are regressed in rst dierence on a EZ
treatment dummy, the propensity score, year dummies (which are not reported here) and, in the last column only,
a EZ treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for the EZ accounting for less than 50% of the population of the
municipalities where the EZ is located (referred to as \small-proportion EZ" in the table). In the table, t/t + 1
designates the rst dierence between semester t and semester t + 1. The rst row of the table involves 1/2 (2nd
semester of 1993/1st semester of 1994), 4/5 (1st/2nd semester of 1995), 7/8 (2nd semester of 1996/1st semester
of 1997), 11/12 (2nd semester of 1998/1st semester of 1999). The number of observations in rst dierence is







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 8: The eect of designation and treatment on semester-specic municipality eects,
robustness to changes in the specication of the treatment group
Treatment group: Treatment group: Treatment group:
municipalities with including including
an EZ municipalities less municipalities less
than 2km of an EZ than 3km of an EZ
EZ treatment eect .031** .010 .009
(.014) (.012) (.010)
Propensity score -.008* -.003 -.001
(.004) (004) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 1947 1881
Note: ***: signicant at 1% level; **: signicant at 5% level; *: signicant at 10% level.
Semester-specic municipality eects are regressed in rst dierence on a EZ treatment dummy, the propensity
score and year dummies (which are not reported here). We only keep semesters between 1 (2nd semester of
1993) and 12 (1st semester of 1999). The number of observations in rst dierence is reported in the last row
of the table. Estimation method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix.
\Municipalities with an EZ" corresponds to our baseline treatment group and includes 13 municipalities. There
are 24 municipalities within 2km of an EZ and 51 municipalities within 3km of an EZ.




































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Semester
Enterprise Zones Non−EZ, 8,000−100,000
Non−EZ, 0−5 km Non−EZ, 5−10 km
Note: The exit rates to employment are reported for semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 20 (1st
semester of 2003). Semester 8 (1st semester of 1997) is the rst semester during which some municipalities are
treated. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ. 8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000
in 1990. 0-Xkm: between 0 and Xkm of a municipality including an EZ. Enterprise zones: municipalities which
include an EZ.




































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Semester
high−proportion EZ low−proportion EZ
non−EZ, pop. 8,000−100,000
Note: The exit rates to employment are reported for semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 20 (1st
semester of 2003). Semester 8 (1st semester of 1997) is the rst semester during which some municipalities are
treated. High-proportion EZ (resp. low-proportion EZ): municipalities including an EZ which accounts for more
(resp. less) than 50% of the population of those municipalities in 1990. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not
include an EZ. 8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990.
42